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Snellen and Ullman: A Handful of Bullets: How the Murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand

Milevski, the state of grand strategic
thinking is “unhelpful” and requires
“rehabilitation” before that state can
change. To say that this conclusion is
surprising is something of an understatement, and it will be interesting to
see how many scholars of grand strategy
agree with Milevski in this regard.
RICHARD J. NORTON

A Handful of Bullets: How the Murder of Archduke
Franz Ferdinand Still Menaces the Peace, by Harlan K. Ullman. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 2014. 214 pages. $34.95.

The legacies of the First World War
are many, and Harlan K. Ullman, a
respected national security practitioner
and academic, offers a thoughtprovoking snapshot of some of the
current challenges facing the United
States that can be linked back to the
war. The book focuses on current policy
debates, but simultaneously attempts
to relate back to historical events.
Ullman argues that the current threat
environment began revealing itself
when Gavrilo Princip assassinated the
archduke of Austria, thus launching the
First World War with only a handful of
bullets. Today, Ullman contends that
there are all kinds of Gavrilo Princips in
the world who can throw international
order into a tailspin. More significantly,
the author argues that the means and
methods of doing so have multiplied.
Ullman’s foundational argument is that
individuals and groups now can have
increased impact vis-à-vis the state. This
change occurred because of the gradual
unraveling of the Westphalian system
and the erosion of state sovereignty
over the last decades. Power is now
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diffused among so many people and
devices that they cannot be quantified.
The consequence is a world with “four
new horsemen of the apocalypse”:
failed governments; economic despair,
disparity, and dislocation; radical
ideologies; and environmental calamity. These represent the main threats
on which the United States should
focus, but unfortunately our policy is
grounded in the past, and our present
strategies address the symptoms instead
of the causes of these threats. This new
environment is difficult for governments
to manage; the United States in particular does not have a system in place that
enables it to cope. Ullman argues that
our political-military system merely
hops back and forth from one crisis
to the next without any real strategy.
The author argues that the United States
desperately needs sounder strategic
thinking. The extent of the national
debt means that resources for projecting military power will be more and
more limited. When a state’s chief
enemies possess no organized military
or economic base, traditional military
power exerts less influence. The United
States must become smarter in spending
for national defense and must formulate
strategies that take into account not
just Iran, China, and Al Qaeda but all
the overarching challenges it faces, as
well as the wild card scenarios that
can emanate from them. However, the
author keenly observes that this strategic
change is unlikely to occur, given the
dysfunction and vitriol in our political
system. Our elected leaders have a
short-term obsession with winning
elections and with the continuous
pursuit of dollars for campaign financing. As many others surely would agree,
Ullman worries that only major crises
can create the impetus for real change.
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Ullman’s main points are sound, even
difficult to disagree with. But most of
the points are not new. Furthermore, the
book at times reads like a laundry list of
things and people with which the author
does not agree; he often voices this
disagreement but provides little depth
or analysis. He bounces around among
multiple topics somewhat chaotically,
from Vladimir Putin to presidential inexperience to Iran’s nuclear ambitions to
universal voting, and so forth. He wades
into cyber. Climate change gets its own
chapter. Infrastructure investment holds
critical importance to him. And then the
author tries to relate most of this back
to the First World War. Sometimes the
historical comparison has coherence, but
at other times it does not work as well.
Nevertheless, the book structures itself
in a unique way and provides a powerful
argument for critical reform in the
national security arena—even as the
author himself notes it is unlikely his
reforms will be implemented. Particularly penetrating are the reasons given
for why the current national security apparatus is unsuitable to the task. The rate
of government development has not kept
up with the pace at which challenges are
arising and the complexity of the world
is increasing. Ullman argues that this
has been demonstrated by the derelict
mismanagement of the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan, the haphazard drone
policy, and the government’s present vulnerability to cyber attacks. To meet these
challenges, our government’s new course
of strategic thinking must effectuate
a restructuring on par with the 1947
National Security Act. We must reform
NATO into a multilateral institution
capable of countering modern threats.
Ullman argues for creating new metrics
for measuring and understanding state
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power. The author also offers a variety
of other, less controversial, unsystematic
proposals. Depending on one’s perspective, the reader may find the book’s arguments to be somber and discouraging,
to constitute a passionate call for action,
or perhaps simply to represent a realistic
paradigm for the present day. Whichever
way, Ullman’s book is a worthwhile read,
and national security experts should
consider his conceptual arguments.
JEREMY SNELLEN

Hannibal, by Patrick N. Hunt. New York: Simon
& Schuster, 2017. 362 pages. $28.

The ancient historian Polybius cautioned
against writing about a place to which
one had not been, and Hannibal
biographer and author Patrick N. Hunt
has heeded this warning. An archaeologist and historian who has taught at
Stanford University since 1993, Hunt
has walked and studied every major
Hannibal battlefield and tracked the
military leader’s routes from Carthage
through Spain, France, Italy, and Turkey.
The National Geographic Society’s
Expedition Council sponsored Hunt’s
2007 and 2008 Hannibal expeditions.
His archaeological fieldwork has
concentrated on Hannibal for decades,
and from 1994 to 2012 he was director
of the Stanford Alpine Archaeology
Project, leading expeditions in the Alps
to explore routes Hannibal might have
taken on his march on Rome. Hunt
thus comes to the topic with decades
of research, and this new biography
is a welcome addition to the study of
Hannibal and his methods of warfare.
The result is a well-written study
delivered via an engaging narrative.
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